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The Death Penalty’s Dark Side: A
Response to Phyllis Goldfarb’s Matters
of Strata: Race, Gender, and Class
Structures in Capital Cases
Kevin Barry* & Bharat Malkani**
Abstract
In Matters of Strata: Race, Gender, and Class Structures in
Capital Cases, Professor Phyllis Goldfarb examines the ways in
which race, class, and gender affect the American criminal justice
system generally, and its death penalty system in particular. This
Response focuses on one of Goldfarb’s observations: The
relationship between slavery and the death penalty. This
relationship helps to explain why, over the past four decades, the
thirteen states that comprised the former Confederacy have been
responsible for nearly all of this nation’s executions. Although the
U.S. Supreme Court has repeatedly failed to address the death
penalty’s roots in slavery, several state court judges have risen to
the occasion, calling out the impermissible taint of bias that colors
the death penalty. This Response suggests how the death penalty’s
connection to slavery should inform death penalty jurisprudence
and concludes with a discussion of the future of abolition, given a
Supreme Court in flux.
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I. Introduction
On February 27, 2017, Arkansas Governor Asa Hutchinson
announced that he would execute one-fifth of those on the state’s
death row because the drugs needed to kill them were set to
expire at the end of April.1 Much was made of how many people
the governor intended to execute—a record eight inmates in
eleven days.2 Much was also made of how they would be
executed—a lethal cocktail of three drugs, one of which has been
known to fail and apparently did fail in at least one of the
executions.3 But little attention has been paid to who was
executed. Although four white men and four black men were
slated for death, three of the four white men were spared.4
Nothing says black lives don’t matter quite like the death
penalty.5
1. Andrew DeMillo, Arkansas Governor Sets Execution Dates for 8
Inmates,
U.S.
NEWS
(Feb.
27,
2017),
https://www.usnews.com/news/arkansas/articles/2017-02-27/arkansas-governorsets-execution-dates-for-8-inmates (last visited May 25, 2017) (on file with the
Washington and Lee Law Review).
2. Camila Domonoske, Arkansas Readies For 8 Executions, Despite Outcry
Over
Pace,
Method,
NAT’L
PUB.
RADIO
(March
31,
2017),
http://www.npr.org/sections/thetwo-way/2017/03/31/521967661/arkansasreadies-for-8-executions-despite-outcry-over-pace-method (last visited May 25.
2017) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
3. Id.; Phil McCausland, Arkansas Execution of Kenneth Williams
‘Horrifying’:
Lawyer,
NBC
NEWS
(April
27,
2017),
http://www.nbcnews.com/storyline/lethal-injection/arkansas-executes-kennethwilliams-4th-lethal-injection-week-n752086 (last visited May 25. 2017) (on file
with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
4. Mark Berman, Fourth Arkansas Execution in Eight Days Prompts
Questions About Inmate’s Movements, WASH. POST (April 28, 2017),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/post-nation/wp/2017/04/27/arkansasreadies-to-carry-out-last-planned-execution-before-drugsexpire/?utm_term=.7f01badaf3e4 (last visited May 25. 2017) (on file with the
Washington and Lee Law Review).
5. See Phyllis Goldfarb, Matters of Strata: Race, Gender, and Class
Structures in Capital Cases, 73 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1395, 1405 (2016)
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The invisibility of race in death penalty jurisprudence is well
documented.6 Some commentators have rightly referred to racism
as the death penalty’s “dark side”: ever-present but often difficult
to discern.7 In her characteristically thoughtful essay, Matters of
Strata: Race, Gender, and Class Structures in Capital Cases,
Professor Phyllis Goldfarb shines the light on the death penalty’s
dark side.8 Using the case of a former Virginia death row inmate,
Joseph Giarratano, as her lens, she examines the multitude of
ways in which race, class, and gender affect the American
criminal justice system generally, and its death penalty system in
particular.9
In this Response, we focus on one of Goldfarb’s observations:
The relationship between slavery—the pinnacle of American
racism—and the death penalty.10 In Part II, we briefly explore
the history of the two institutions.11 The death penalty’s
connection to slavery is not a distant parallel; it is a straight line.
Over the past four decades, the thirteen states of the former
Confederacy have been responsible for nearly all of this nation’s
executions.12 This relationship is not a coincidence.
We next turn to judicial responses to slavery and the death
penalty. In Part III, we discuss how a majority of the United
States Supreme Court has been unwilling to draw a link between

(“[Q]uestions about whether and how black lives matter are still haunting us, as
they have for centuries.”).
6. See, e.g., Carol S. Steiker & Jordan M. Steiker, Courting Death: The
Supreme Court and Capital Punishment 78–115 (2016).
7. See id. at 321 (discussing “the darker sides of the American death
penalty—particularly the extent to which the resonance of the practice and its
continued use have been inseparably connected to race”).
8. Goldfarb, supra note 5, at 1395–99.
9. See generally id.
10. See id, at 1401–05. We are in good company discussing this connection
in relation to Goldfarb’s work. For a thoughtful and thorough response to
Goldfarb’s essay that discusses the death penalty’s roots in slavery, see generally
John D. Bessler, The Inequality of America’s Death Penalty: A Crossroads for
Capital Punishment at the Intersection of the Eighth and Fourteenth
Amendments, 73 WASH. & LEE L. REV. ONLINE 487 (2017).
11. See infra Part II.
12. See State v. Santiago, 122 A.3d 1, 52 (Conn. 2015) (noting that “[t]he
thirteen states that comprised the Confederacy have carried out more than 75
percent of the nation’s executions over the past four decades”).
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slavery and the death penalty.13 From Furman and McCleskey to
Buck and Foster, the Court has responded with silence when
confronted with the death penalty’s roots in slavery.
In Part IV, we discuss several state court justices that have
risen to the occasion, finding an unacceptable taint of racial bias
in the administration of the death penalty dating back to
slavery.14 We discuss their findings and suggest two doctrinal
pathways for future courts to follow. Specifically, we argue that
the death penalty’s roots in slavery should inform courts’
determination of the national consensus that the death penalty
purportedly enjoys and the legitimate purposes that it
purportedly achieves.
In Part V, we discuss the future of abolition, given a
Supreme Court in flux.15 We conclude with some general
remarks.
II. A Straight Line
The death penalty’s connection to slavery is not the stuff of
hyperbole or analogy. The histories of both institutions are tightly
bound. As Goldfarb explains, “the ghosts of the colonial and
antebellum slave system” continue to haunt our death penalty.16
Indeed, “[o]ne cannot understand America’s penologies of capital
punishment—its legitimation of state-imposed death—without
understanding its ideologies of race” that began with slavery.17
From the earliest colonial days, slavery and the death
penalty were symbiotic.18 In the southern states, one of the
principal purposes behind the death penalty was to protect the
white minority from violence and rebellion by an enslaved black
13. See infra Part III.
14. See infra Part IV.
15. See infra Part V.
16. See Goldfarb, supra note 5, at 1404–05.
17. Id. at 1400–02.
18. See STEIKER, supra note 6, at 17 (“The distinctive Southern embrace of
capital punishment is in large part a product of the South’s historical practice of
chattel slavery and of slavery’s enduring racial legacy long after the end of the
Civil War.”); see also STUART BANNER, THE DEATH PENALTY: AN AMERICAN
HISTORY 142 (2002) (“The South’s retention of capital punishment for blacks was
surely a direct result of slavery.”).
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majority.19 Capital punishment was therefore a vital component
in the machinery of slavery: the perpetual threat of death served
to keep slave populations under control.20 Fear of captivity in
prison, the reasoning went, would mean little to those already
enslaved; indeed, “imprisonment would have been a reward,
giving the slave time to rest.”21 Without the threat of death,
slavery may have been lost to rebellion.22 And without slavery,
the death penalty may have lost its appeal as a deterrent.23
Slavery demanded the death penalty, and the death penalty, in
turn, demanded slavery. The connection between the institutions
is not a distant parallel but rather a straight line.
Slavery and the death penalty not only reinforced each other
but also closely resembled each other—both were explicitly race
conscious in their application.24 Although the death penalty,
unlike slavery, applied to both blacks and whites, state “slave
codes” ensured that blacks were subject to capital punishment for
a wider range of crimes than whites.25 Such laws even
compensated white slaveholders for the “taking” of executed
slaves.26 In colonial Georgia, for example, the criminal code
19. Id. at 7, 19.
20. Id.
21. Brief of Amici Curiae National Association for the Advancement of
Colored People et al., Aikens v. California, 1971 WL 134376, at *9 (U.S. Aug. 31,
1971) [hereinafter NAACP Amic. Br.]; see also BANNER, supra note 18, at 142.
22. Cf. MANISHA SINHA, THE SLAVE’S CAUSE 500 (2016) (discussing slave
rebellions and revolutionary abolition).
23. Diann Rust-Tierney, We, Too, Are Abolitionists: Black History Month,
Slavery and the Death Penalty, HUFFINGTON POST (May 25, 2011),
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/diann-rusttierney/we-too-areabolitionists_b_168386.html (last visited May 25, 2017) (“Had it not been for
slavery, the death penalty would have likely been abolished in America.”) (on
file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
24. See NAACP Amic. Br., supra note 21, at *8–11 (discussing the pre-1935
history of formal and informal capital punishment by whites against nonwhites).
25. See id. at *9 (“Every southern state defined a substantial number of
felonies carrying capital punishment for slaves and lesser punishments for
whites.”).
26. See STEIKER, supra note 6, at 19–21 (noting that the owners of executed
slaves were compensated “in the same way that property owners today are
compensated when their land is taken by the state for a public use such as a
highway”); see also Race and Capital Sentencing, 101 HARV. L. REV. 1603, 1619
n.11 (1988) (discussing slave codes’ racially disparate punishments); Harry V.
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provided for an automatic death sentence for blacks who
committed murder, while non-black murderers could receive a life
sentence.27
During the 1830s and 1840s, many states limited their lists
of capital crimes and moved executions out of the public arena
into more private settings.28 Importantly, these death penalty
reforms did not extend to slaves and free blacks.29 A study by
George Stroud in 1856 found that in Virginia, for example, there
were sixty-six potentially capital crimes that attracted the death
penalty when committed by slaves, yet just one crime for which
white defendants could be executed.30 In Mississippi, there were
thirty-eight crimes that were capital for slaves but not for
whites.31 And in Georgia, as in many southern states, black men
were executed for raping white women, while white men were
imprisoned or fined.32
Slaves and free blacks also faced gruesome public executions,
including crucifixion, starvation, and having one’s hands cut off
prior to being hanged or burned alive.33 White defendants, by
contrast, were hanged in private.34 The emergence of such
racially disparate death penalties reinforced the view—held to
Ball & Lawrence M. Friedman, The Use of Criminal Sanctions in the
Enforcement of Economic Legislation: A Sociological View, 17 STAN. L. REV. 197,
212 n.50 (1965) (discussing slave codes’ reimbursement of slaveholders).
27. See State v. Loftin, 724 A.2d 129, 207 (N.J. 1999) (Handler, J.,
dissenting) (citing McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 329 (1987) (Brennan, J.,
dissenting))).
28. See, e.g., BANNER, supra note 18, at 139–41; STEIKER, supra note 6, at
20–21; Stuart Banner, Traces of Slavery: Race and the Death Penalty in
Historical Perspective, in FROM LYNCH MOBS TO THE KILLING STATE: RACE AND
THE DEATH PENALTY IN AMERICA 103–06 (Charles J. Ogletree Jr & Austin Sarat
eds. 2006).
29. See, e.g., Loftin, 724 A.2d at 208 (discussing racially disparate manner
of executions); NAACP Amic. Br., supra note 21, at *9–11 (discussing racially
disparate punishments).
30. GEORGE M STROUD, A SKETCH OF THE LAWS RELATING TO SLAVERY IN THE
SEVERAL STATES OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 75–87 (2d ed. 1856).
31. Id.
32. Id.
33. See Loftin, 724 A.2d at 208 (discussing racial distinctions in
administration of death penalty); see also NAACP Amic. Br., supra note 21, at
*9 (discussing crucifixion, burning, and starvation).
34. See Loftin, 724 A.2d at 208.
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this day—that black bodies are worth less than those of whites.35
Not surprisingly, the opponents of slavery, like Frederick
Douglass, decried the death penalty as “a mockery of justice.”36
Although many slavery abolitionists contributed to the cause
of death penalty abolition by “excoriating ‘hangman clergymen’
who supported the death penalty and the inhumane notion of
retributive justice,”37 the progress of the anti-slavery movement
brought efforts to eliminate capital punishment to a halt in the
1850s and 1860s.38 For example, in Connecticut, a grassroots
campaign to abolish the death penalty in the 1840s and early
1850s foundered in 1854, as “[p]ublic attention turned away to
the more pressing issues of Irish immigration and the expansion
of slavery in the western territories.”39 And Marvin Bovee delayed
the publication of his anti-death penalty book on the eve of the
Civil War, noting that it would be inappropriate to defend the
lives of murderers and rapists when so many soldiers were
heroically sacrificing their lives on the battlefield.40 As David
Brion Davis has argued, after the Civil War, Americans were
35. South Carolina’s 1740 slave code “must be understood not only for what
it did to blacks and slaves—assuring their submissiveness, guaranteeing their
ignorance, and sanctioning great brutality,” but also for what it did to whites—
“impos[ing] an obligation on white inhabitants to set aside any natural human
compassion and grant[ing] extraordinary inducements to those who would revel
in brutality against blacks.” A. LEON HIGGINBOTHAM JR, IN THE MATTER OF
COLOR: RACE AND THE AMERICAN LEGAL PROCESS, THE COLONIAL PERIOD 199
(1978).
36. Frederick Douglass, Capital Punishment is a Mockery of Justice, in 3
John Blassingame, The Frederick Douglass Papers 242–248 (1985); see also
Paul Christian Jones, Against the Gallows: Antebellum American Writers and
the Movement to Abolish Capital Punishment (2011).
37. Sinha, supra note 22, at 380; see also Banner, supra note 18, at 142–43
(“In the North the most outspoken supporters of abolishing capital punishment
were also in favor of abolishing slavery and a host of other reforms.”); Lawrence
B. Goodheart, The Solemn Sentence of Death:
Capital Punishment in
Connecticut 107 (2011) (discussing “mainstream ministers [who] denounced the
radical antislavery movement” and “castigated opponents of the death penalty”).
38. Banner, supra note 18, at 134; see also Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S.
238, 338–39 (1972) (Marshall, J., concurring) (discussing the history of
abolition).
39. Goodheart, supra note 37, at 109.
40. John D. Bessler, Death in the Dark: Midnight Executions in America
45–46 (1997). Bovee eventually published his tract in 1869, see generally Marvin
Bovee, Christ and the Gallows; or, Reasons for the Abolition of Capital
Punishment (1869).
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hardened to the loss of life, thus dissipating any anti-death
penalty sentiments.41
As Goldfarb explains, following the end of slavery, the death
penalty was vital to reasserting white control over the newlyfreed black population.42 In the years following the Civil War,
slave codes gave way to “Black Codes,” which reinstated a dual
system of criminal justice based explicitly on race, with the death
penalty at its center.43 As was the case under slavery, blacks
“were given harsher punishments than whites for committing
similar offenses.”44 In Alabama, Mississippi, and South Carolina,
for example, “only blacks could be executed for raping a white
woman.”45
Although Reconstruction ended de jure discrimination under
the Black Codes, it did not—and, indeed, could not—end de facto
discrimination.46 As Goldfarb notes, “[t]he past was not the past;
it flourished in new forms.”47 Reconstruction’s failure to secure
equal rights for black people has been well-documented, with
numerous scholars detailing how proponents of racial segregation
turned to the criminal justice system, generally—and the death
penalty, specifically—as a tool of racial control.48 Racial
discrimination, no longer explicit in the law, persisted in the
administration of the death penalty under Jim Crow.49
41. See David Brion Davis, From Homicide to Slavery: Studies in American
Culture 40 (1986) (“After the Civil War, men’s finer sensibilities, which had once
been revolted by the execution of a fellow being, seemed hardened and
blunted.”).
42. Goldfarb, supra note 5, at 1402; see also Steiker, supra note 6, at 19.
43. State v. Loftin, 724 A.2d 129, 208 (N.J. 1999) (Handler, J., dissenting).
44. Id.
45. Id.
46. See Loftin, 724 A.2d at 208 (“Despite the abolition of the Black Codes
during Reconstruction, racial discrimination in the administration of criminal
justice remained.”); Goldfarb, supra note 5, at 1402 (discussing selective
enforcement of law enforcement policies during Jim Crow era).
47. Goldfarb, supra note 5, at 1403.
48. See, e.g., id. at 1402–03 (“[S]trictly enforced racial segregation policies
and selectively enforced law enforcement policies . . . provid[ed] white majorities
with the control they felt they needed”); see also MICHELLE ALEXANDER, THE NEW
JIM CROW: MASS INCARCERATION IN THE AGE OF COLORBLINDNESS (2010); KHALIL
GIBRAN MUHAMMAD, THE CONDEMNATION OF BLACKNESS: RACE, CRIME, AND THE
MAKING OF MODERN URBAN AMERICA (2011).
49. See Goldfarb, supra note 5, at 1402 (“When federal efforts to support
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In the late nineteenth century, southern states openly
defended a racially discriminatory death penalty as necessary to
deter white vigilantism, i.e., lynching.50 Black people suspected of
crimes were going to be killed no matter what, the argument
went. Better, then, to execute black people after trial than for
white mobs to cut them down and parade their mutilated remains
through the street. The Equal Justice Initiative has noted that
when proponents of racial justice campaigned against lynchings
during the 1920s and 1930s, communities turned to the death
penalty instead.51 Campaigns against lynchings in the early
twentieth century, therefore, ultimately helped to consolidate the
use of capital punishment in America.
In the mid-twentieth century, the progress of racial justice
once again worked to the disadvantage of death penalty abolition.
Between 1957 and 1965, five states abolished the death penalty—
Alaska, Hawaii, Vermont, West Virginia, and Iowa.52 But, as
Goldfarb notes, the successes of the Civil Rights movement in the
1960s and 1970s provide at least a partial explanation for the
failure of the anti-death penalty movement to secure lasting,
nationwide abolition before the U.S. Supreme Court.53 When the
Court temporarily outlawed capital punishment in 1972 in
Furman v. Georgia, it was perceived as yet another interference
with “states’ rights”—the same argument advanced by the

and protect former slaves during the Reconstruction era were brought to a
premature halt, strictly enforced racial segregation policies and selectively
enforced law enforcement policies--the era known as Jim Crow--emerged,
providing white majorities with the control they felt they needed.”).
50. STEIKER, supra note 6, at 23 (“[O]ne of the primary considerations in
favor of retention (and of reinstatement after abolition) of the death penalty was
the need to maintain capital punishment to reduce incidence of mob violence.”).
51. EQUAL JUSTICE INITIATIVE, LYNCHING IN AMERICA: CONFRONTING THE
LEGACY OF RACIAL TERROR (2d ed. 2015), http://eji.org/sites/default/files/lynchingin-america-second-edition-summary.pdf; see also James W. Clarke, Without Fear
or Shame: Lynching, Capital Punishment and the Subculture of Violence in the
American South, 28 BRIT. J. POL. SCI. 268, 284–85 (1998).
52. Hugo Adam Bedau, Background and Developments, in THE DEATH
PENALTY IN AMERICA, CURRENT CONTROVERSIES 3, 9 (1997).
53. Goldfarb, supra note 5, at 1410–11 (“But for the resentment of civil
rights progress that led to restoration of capital punishment, the death penalty
would have been unavailable.”); see also EVAN MANDERY, A WILD JUSTICE: THE
DEATH AND RESURRECTION OF CAPITAL PUNISHMENT IN AMERICA 264–280 (2013).
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Confederate states in defense of slavery.54 This backlash
culminated in the restoration of the death penalty four years
later in Gregg v. Georgia,55 which purported to rid the death
penalty of arbitrariness once and for all.56
Not surprisingly, given the death penalty’s roots in slavery
and its reinforcement of racial subordination after the Civil War,
the task the Supreme Court set for itself in Gregg has proven
impossible. The post-1972 death penalty systems, like their
forbearers, remain rife with discrimination.57 As Carol and
Jordan Steiker note, “the current map of active death penalty
states is predominantly a map of the former Confederacy.”58 And
as Goldfarb points out, nearly all executions occur in states “with
the most extensive lynching histories.”59The sickening spectacle
in Arkansas in April 2017 is a case in point.60 Arkansas, a former
slaveholding state, seceded from the Union at the start of the
Civil War in 1861.61 Between 1877 and 1950, 491 African
Americans were lynched in Arkansas, just behind Mississippi
(614), Georgia (595), and Louisiana (559).62 Further, Arkansas is
home to Phillips County, the site of a staggering 244 lynchings—
54. See Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 239–40 (1972). During oral
arguments in Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153 (1976), the Solicitor General—
Robert Bork—argued that “these cases are about democratic government, the
right of various legislatures of the United States, to choose or reject—according
to their own moral sense and that of the people, the death penalty, in
accordance with the Constitution.” EVAN MANDERY, A WILD JUSTICE: THE DEATH
AND RESURRECTION OF CAPITAL PUNISHMENT IN AMERICA 386—387 (2013).
55. 428 U.S. 153, 195 (1976).
56. See id. (stating that concerns with arbitrariness could be “met by a
system that provides for a bifurcated proceeding”).
57. See, e.g., State v. Santiago, 122 A.3d 1, 66–68 (Conn. 2015); State v.
Loftin, 724 A.2d 129, 208 (N.J. 1999); see also STEIKER, supra note 6, at 110
(“[T]he unjust influence of race in the capital punishment process continues
unchecked.”); Bedau, supra note 52, at 459 (“The good-faith hopes of the Gregg
majority in 1976 . . . have simply not been borne out in practice in the two
decades since then.”).
58. STEIKER, supra note 6, at 17.
59. Goldfarb, supra note 5, at 1409.
60. See generally DeMillo, supra note 1, and accompanying text.
61. Ralph Wooster, The Arkansas Secession Convention, 13 ARK. HIST. Q.
172 (1954).
62. EQUAL JUST. INITIATIVE, LYNCHING IN AMERICA: CONFRONTING THE
LEGACY OF RACIAL TERROR, SECOND EDITION 16, http://eji.org/sites/default/files/
lynching-in-america-second-edition-summary.pdf.
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the most of any county in the U.S. and nearly five times the
number of lynchings as second place Caddo, Louisiana, with 51.63
The northern experience also sheds light on the death
penalty’s connection to slavery. In the late 1700’s and early
1800’s, for example, the northern states of Pennsylvania, New
Hampshire, Massachusetts, Connecticut, Rhode Island, Vermont,
New York, and New Jersey took steps to restrict the use of capital
punishment.64 In the years that followed, the death penalty faded
in these states as the number of death-eligible crimes and
executions declined, and as calls for abolition of the death penalty
increased.65 Connecticut is a case in point. Over the course of its
nearly 400-year-old experiment with the death penalty, a single
theme characterized Connecticut’s relationship to the death
penalty: the reluctance to impose it.66 Indeed, between 1960 and
2012, when it repealed the death penalty, Connecticut executed
only 2 people—both of whom volunteered for it.67
In many non-slave-holding states admitted to the Union in
the first half of the nineteenth century, the connection between
slavery and the death penalty was even more direct. Michigan
and Wisconsin, which were admitted as free states in 1837 and
1848, respectively, abolished their death penalties less than a
decade after admission.68 Maine, admitted in 1820, and
63. Id. at 17.
64. STEIKER, supra note 6, at 20–21; see generally David Brion Davis, The
Movement to Abolish Capital Punishment in America, 1787-1861, 63 AM. HIST.
REVIEW 23 (1957) (surveying the history of the abolition of the death penalty in
several Northern states).
65. See, e.g., State v. Santiago, 122 A.3d 1, 36 (Conn. 2015) (stating that
“[s]ecularization, evolving moral standards, new constitutional and procedural
protections, and the availability of incarceration as a viable alternative to
execution have resulted in capital punishment being available for far fewer
crimes and criminals, and being imposed far less frequently, with a concomitant
deterioration in public acceptance” over Connecticut’s “nearly 400 year history”);
STEIKER, supra note 18, at 20–21 (discussing “[t]he substantial narrowing of the
ambit of the death penalty down to murder and treason . . . in the North by the
time of the Civil War,” and discussing “legislative initiatives for wholesale
abolition of capital punishment in the North . . . [f]rom the 1830s to the 1850s”).
66. See Santiago, 122 A.3d at 38 (“[C]onnecticut’s] whole state history
demonstrates a reluctance to impose the death penalty.”) (internal quotation
marks omitted).
67. Id.
68. Bedau, supra note 52, at 9.
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Minnesota, admitted in 1858, took a bit longer; they abolished
their death-penalties within seventy and sixty years of admission,
respectively.69 While the northern states were no strangers to
racism, their racism knew bounds.70
From this brisk historical survey, a central theme emerges:
where slavery was not firmly entrenched, the death penalty
withered; where slavery flourished, the death penalty remained
an integral part of the criminal justice system. As Carol and
Jordan Steiker have noted, in the North, the death penalty
abolition movement and the slavery abolition movement were
“mutually reinforcing.”71 In the South, the linkage of the two
movements “led them to fail together.”72
Some have taken offense to the death penalty’s comparison to
slavery. During a public hearing on the bill that repealed
Connecticut’s death penalty in 2012, State Senator John Kissel, a
Republican with six prisons and 8,000 inmates in his district,
objected to testimony comparing the death penalty to slavery:
[T]o analogize folks that support [the death penalty] to people
that supported slavery, that’s so offensive. To analogize this to
individuals that just act out of rage or vindictiveness, that’s
just not right. . . . I take umbrage at the whole slavery thing
because, once upon a time, one of my relatives was a surgeon
in the union side of the Civil War. Come on, man, . . . to make
that analogy, I think, is a stretch.73

But the link between slavery and the death penalty is not a
stretch, and the death penalty’s support among northerners does
69. Id. at 9.
70. Compare Dist. Attorney for Suffolk Dist. v. Watson, 411 N.E.2d 1274,
1286 (Mass. 1980) (“We reject any suggestion that racial discrimination is
confined to the South or to any other geographical area.”), with Santiago, 122
A.3d at 52 (noting that executions are “overwhelmingly confined to the South
[and states bordering the South], the very same jurisdictions that were last to
abandon slavery and segregation, and . . . were most resistant to the federal
enforcement of civil rights norms”); see also Loftin, 724 A.2d at 206 (Handler, J.,
dissenting) (discussing racism, slavery, and the death penalty); NAACP Amic.
Br., supra note 20, at *8-13 (same).
71. STEIKER, supra note 6, at 22.
72. Id.
73. Hrg. on Raised Bill No. 280, An Act Revising the Penalty for Capital
Felonies, Before the Connecticut General Assembly, Joint Committee on
Judiciary,
March
14,
2012
(statement
of
Sen.
John
Kissel)
https://www.cga.ct.gov/2012/juddata/chr/2012JUD00314-R001100-CHR.htm.
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not make it so. While it is true that people in Connecticut have
supported the death penalty throughout history, they—unlike
their brethren to the south—have been reluctant to use it.74 And
one of the primary reasons that Connecticut has lacked an
appetite for execution is because it does not share the South’s
long history of slavery and its tolerance for state-sponsored
violence to sustain racial control.75
III. The Silent Branch
In Dred Scott v. Sanford, the U.S. Supreme Court explicitly
sanctioned slavery, articulating a powerful defense of racial
subordination that set the stage for the Civil War.76 Although the
Supreme Court has not explicitly defended racial subordination
in the death penalty context, it certainly has not challenged it. In
Justice Accused, Robert Cover examines how the judiciary
responded to the moral and legal dilemmas posed by slavery, and
notes how even anti-slavery judges were ultimately complicit in
the survival of slavery.77 His analysis can be applied to today’s
judiciary, particularly the ways in which the U.S. Supreme Court
has failed to acknowledge the pervasive influence of slavery on
the administration of capital punishment.
A majority of the Supreme Court has never addressed the
death penalty’s historical roots in slavery. Take Furman, for
example, in which a majority of the Court imposed a moratorium
on the death penalty out of concern for arbitrariness.78 Despite
the centrality of race to the issue of arbitrariness, only Justices
Douglas and Marshall squarely addressed racial discrimination
74. See generally supra notes 66–67 and accompanying text (discussing
Connecticut’s reluctance to impose death penalty).
75. See generally supra note 18 and accompanying text (discussing
relationship between slavery and death penalty).
76. See Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. 393, 407 (1857) (“[N]either the class
of persons who had been imported as slaves, nor their descendants, whether
they had become free or not, were then acknowledged as a part of the people,
nor intended to be included in the general words used in [the Declaration of
Independence].”).
77. See generally ROBERT M. COVER, JUSTICE ACCUSED: ANTISLAVERY AND
THE JUDICIAL PROCESS (1984).
78. Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 239–40 (1972).
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in their concurring opinions.79 Neither of them mentioned
slavery.80 Some commentators argue that the majority’s decision
to ignore race enabled, or even encouraged, states to recalibrate
their death penalty statutes.81
McCleskey v Kemp, decided in 1987, is often considered to be
the Court’s seminal decision on the relevance of race to questions
of the death penalty’s constitutionality.82 In that case, the Court
infamously held that statistical evidence of racial disparities in
the application of capital punishment are to be tolerated, and
that a person’s death sentence will only be quashed on such
grounds if it can be shown that a decision-maker in his or her
particular case acted with specific discriminatory intent.83 Not
surprisingly, the majority made no mention of the death penalty’s
roots in slavery. Only Justice Brennan, writing for the four
dissenters, drew parallels between the modern death penalty and
the race-conscious criminal justice systems that reinforced
slavery.84 “[W]e cannot pretend that in three decades we have
completely escaped the grip of a historical legacy spanning
centuries,” he wrote.85 “[W]e remain imprisoned by the past as
long as we deny its influence on the present.”86
The decision in McCleskey has been described by Anthony
Amsterdam, who led the death penalty abolitionist efforts of the
1960s and 1970s, as “the Dred Scott of our time.”87 Michelle
Alexander has likewise written that “McCleskey v. Kemp and its
progeny serve much the same function as Dred Scott and
79. Id. at 256–57 (Douglas, J., concurring) (stating that standardless death
penalty statutes were “pregnant with discrimination”); id. at 364 (Marshall, J.,
concurring) (“It is immediately apparent that Negroes were executed far more
often than whites in proportion to their percentage of the population.”).
80. See generally id.
81. See MANDERY, supra note 54, at 277–278 (noting that “those aggrieved
by the Court’s race decisions sublimated their anger into the effort to revive
capital punishment”).
82. See McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279 (1987).
83. Id. at 297–99, 312–13.
84. Id. at 328–33 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
85. Id. at 344.
86. Id.
87. Adam Liptak, New Look at Death Sentences and Race, NY TIMES (April
29, 2008), http://www.nytimes.com/2008/04/29/us/29bar.html (last visited May
30, 2017) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
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Plessy”—preserving racial caste systems.88 In Dred Scott, Chief
Justice Taney infamously declared that slaves were sub-human
for the purposes of the American legal system: “It is too clear for
dispute, that the enslaved African race were not intended to be
included, and formed no part of the people who framed and
adopted [the Declaration of Independence].”89 In Taney’s view,
black people were “so far inferior, that they had no rights which
the white man was bound to respect . . . [Africans] were brought
and sold, and treated as an ordinary article of merchandise and
traffic, whenever a profit could be made of it.”90 As McCleskey’s
many critics rightly argue, capital punishment, like slavery, is
premised on the belief that some people are not worthy of
membership in the human family.91
Besides Justice Brennan, no other Supreme Court Justice
has attempted to place the death penalty in its historical, slaveryrooted context. Instead, the focus has been on the notoriously
difficult-to-prove animus and stereotypes of individual actors in
the death penalty system—not on the system itself. In recent
years, for example, the Court has struck down several death
sentences in which inmates have demonstrated that prosecutors
or jurors based their decision to seek or impose a death sentence
on the grounds of race. However, in none of these cases have the
Justices expressly acknowledged the legacy of slavery.
In Buck v. Davis,92 decided earlier this year, the Court
accepted that Duane Buck had been unconstitutionally sentenced
to death because a psychologist had testified that, as a black
man, Buck was particularly prone to violence.93 But Chief Justice
Roberts, writing for a 6-2 majority, failed to note that this
88. ALEXANDER, supra note 48, at 194.
89. Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. 393, 407 (1857).
90. Id.
91. See, e.g., McCleskey, 481 U.S. at 336 (Brennan, J., dissenting)
(“Enhanced willingness to impose the death sentence on black defendants, or
diminished willingness to render such a sentence when blacks are victims,
reflects a devaluation of the lives of black persons.”).
92. 137 S. Ct. 759 (2017).
93. See id. at 776 (holding that defense attorney’s introduction of
psychologist’s testimony that “one of the factors pertinent in assessing a
person’s propensity for violence was his race, and that Buck was statistically
more likely to act violently because he is black” constituted ineffective
assistance of counsel).
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stereotype—that a black man is biologically prone to
“dangerousness”—derives from the so-called scientific studies
that were used to justify slavery.94 Similarly, in Foster v.
Chatman,95 decided in 2016, the Court ruled in favor of
petitioner, and chastised the prosecutor who had deliberately
struck black people off the jury with the intent to empanel an allwhite jury.96 As Goldfarb notes in her article, the phenomenon of
all-white juries being empaneled against black defendants so as
to ensure a conviction finds it roots in slavery and in postemancipation attempts to subjugate black people.97 Yet the Court
in Foster v. Chatman again refrained from mentioning slavery.98
Taking their lead from the Supreme Court, the lower federal
courts and nearly all state courts have remained silent on the
death penalty’s connection to slavery. For example, the Fourth
Circuit Court of Appeals recently overturned Johnny Bennett’s
death sentence on the grounds that the prosecutor in his case had
used racially inflammatory language during the trial.99
Prosecutor Donald Myers had referred to Bennett—an African
American—variously as “King Kong,” a “caveman,” a “mountain
man,” a “monster,” a “big old tiger,” and “[t]he beast of burden.”100
Although the Court found in Bennett’s favor, it made only oblique
reference to “historical prejudice against African Americans, who
have been appallingly disparaged as primates or members of a
subhuman species in some lesser state of evolution.”101
The reluctance of courts to explicitly use the word “slavery,”
or to squarely confront the ways in which the legacy of slavery is
woven into the fabric of capital punishment, can mean only one of
94. Id. at 776 (characterizing the psychologist’s testimony as “a particularly
noxious strain of racial prejudice” without reference to its roots in slavery).
95. 136 S. Ct. 1737 (2016).
96. See id. at 1755 (holding that “prosecutors were motivated in substantial
part by race when they struck [two black prospective jurors]”).
97. See Goldfarb, supra note 5, at 1414–15 (discussing jury eligibility laws
and jury selection practices that combine to exclude African-Americans from the
jury box).
98. See generally Foster, 136 S. Ct. 1737.
99. See Bennett v. Stirling, 842 F.3d 319, 324-25 (2016) (holding that
prosecutor’s argument, which depicted Bennett “as less human on account of his
race,” exceeded “all permissible bounds” in violation of due process).
100. Id. at 321.
101. Id. at 324–25.
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three things. First, there simply is no connection between slavery
and the modern death penalty: the past is in the past, thanks to
procedural safeguards imposed by the Supreme Court. Second,
there is a connection, but courts are not troubled by it. Or third,
there is a troubling connection, but there is nothing courts can do
about it.
The first conclusion is untenable. The Court in Gregg did not
sever the death penalty’s ties to slavery and racial
subordination,102 and the regional differences in the application of
the death penalty are not coincidental. As Goldfarb ably
demonstrates, racial animus and stereotypes are not issues that
affect some cases but not others.103 The entire death penalty
system is steeped in the values and beliefs that underpinned
slavery; the notion that some people do not belong to the moral
and political human community and can be treated and discarded
as mere objects instead.104
The second conclusion is unthinkable. The Court, as a
chronicler of history, has an obligation to expose the death
penalty’s roots in slavery.105 By remaining silent, the Court
legitimizes a racial legacy that continues to drive the death
penalty today.
The third conclusion is unacceptable. There is much the
Court can do and little to prevent it from doing so. We turn now
to the ways in which several state supreme court justices have
addressed the death penalty’s connections to slavery, and how
102. See Glossip v. Gross, 135 S. Ct. at 2760 (2015) (“Despite the Gregg
Court’s hope for fair administration of the death penalty, 40 years of further
experience make it increasingly clear that the death penalty is imposed
arbitrarily, i.e., without the ‘reasonable consistency’ legally necessary to
reconcile its use with the Constitution's commands.”) (quoting Gregg).
103. See Goldfarb, supra note 5, at 1408 (“To one degree or another, every
criminal case has been shaped by race. Our criminal justice system was forged
in America's racial cauldron and would not look as it does but for our racial
history.”).
104. See Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 272–73 (1972) (Brennan, J.,
concurring) (“The true significance of . . . punishments [condemned by history] is
that they treat members of the human race as nonhumans, as objects to be
toyed with and discarded.”).
105. See STEIKER, supra note 6, at 111 (“[T]he Court’s failure to address
forthrightly the death penalty’s racialized history and current practice has
disserved the Court in its role as chronicler of history and social and political
practices.”).
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and why the Supreme Court and state and federal lower courts
should do the same.
IV. Looking Back, a Way Forward
The Supreme Court’s failure to address the death penalty’s
connection to slavery serves only to deepen the connection. As
Chief Justice Roberts noted in another context, “[T]o blind
yourself to history is both prideful and unwise. ‘The past is never
dead. It’s not even past.’”106
Despite the Supreme Court’s silence, several state courts
have risen to the occasion, expressing concern over the death
penalty’s ties to racism generally, and to slavery in particular. In
1980, in District Attorney v. Watson, the Massachusetts Supreme
Judicial Court held that the death penalty violated the state
constitution based in part on evidence of racial discrimination in
the administration of the death penalty throughout the southern
states.107 According to the court, “[t]he conclusion is inescapable
that the death penalty is reserved for those who kill whites,
because the criminal justice system in these states simply does
not put the same value on the life of a black person as it does on
the life of a white.”108 The race of the defendant also mattered,
with “a disproportionate number of nonwhite offenders being
sentenced to death.”109 To the Massachusetts high court, this
discounting of black lives, a practice rooted in slavery, was fatal
to the death penalty.
In 1999, in State v. Loftin, Justice Handler of the New Jersey
Supreme Court similarly argued in dissent that New Jersey’s
death penalty statute was unconstitutional because of “a long and
relentless history of racism that has not only the capacity to
106. Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2623 (2015) (Roberts, C.J.,
dissenting) (quoting William Faulkner, REQUIEM FOR A NUN 92 (1951)).
107. Dist. Att’y for Suffolk Cty. v. Watson, 411 N.E.2d 1274, 1285–86 (Mass.
1980), superseded by constitutional amendment, MASS. CONST. art. CXVI, and
by statute, MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 265, § 2 (2008); see also State v. Dicks, 615
S.W.2d 126, 134 (Tenn. 1981) (finding “irrefutable” the Watson Court’s
conclusion that “the death penalty is administered with unconstitutional
arbitrariness and discrimination”).
108. Id. at 1286.
109. Id.
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cause a disproportionate impact on blacks in the administration
of the death penalty, but has indeed done so from the era of
slavery in this country, and, many argue, to the present.”110
And in 2015, in State v. Santiago, the Connecticut Supreme
Court declared the death penalty unconstitutional based, in part,
on its finding that the death penalty “appears to be inescapably
tainted by caprice and bias,” particularly, “racial and ethnic
discrimination.”111 Significantly, statistical evidence of such
discrimination was not before the court, nor were alleged
instances of racial bias by individual prosecutors, jurors, and
judges.112 Instead, the court assumed that there existed a risk of
racial and ethnic discrimination in capital sentencing, and
concluded that such risk deprived the death penalty of any
legitimate penological purpose.113 The court also pointed to the
“striking” disparity in death penalty usage between the northern
states and “the thirteen states that comprised the Confederacy,”
110. State v. Loftin, 724 A.2d 129, 206 (N.J. 1999) (Handler, J., dissenting);
see also id. at 207–08 (discussing historical relationship between slavery and the
death penalty).
111. State v. Santiago, 122 A.3d 1, 66–68 (Conn. 2015); see also id. at 36
(“[T]hroughout every period of our state’s history, the death penalty has been
imposed disproportionately on those whom society has marginalized socially,
politically, and economically: people of color, the poor and uneducated, and
unpopular immigrant and ethnic groups. It always has been easier for us to
execute those we see as inferior or less intrinsically worthy.”).
112. Compare id. at 85 (Norcott & McDonald, JJ., concurring) (“[W]e cannot
end our state's nearly 400 year struggle with the macabre muck of capital
punishment litigation without speaking to the persistent allegations of racial
and ethnic discrimination that have permeated the breadth of this state's
experience with capital charging and sentencing decisions. We recognize that
this particular challenge to [racial and ethnic discrimination in] our state's
capital punishment regime has not been raised or briefed in the present case
and, therefore, cannot serve as the basis for the majority’s holding today.”), with
id. at 67 n. 104 “Justices Norcott and McDonald refer to what now appears to be
strong evidence demonstrating that impermissible racial and ethnic disparities
have, in fact, permeated this state's capital sentencing scheme. We decline to
address or resolve such claims, however, because they are not before us at this
time.”).
113. See id. at 66–68 (concluding that “individualized sentencing necessarily
opens the door to racial and ethnic discrimination in capital sentencing,” and
that it is not “possible to eliminate arbitrary and discriminatory application of
capital punishment through a more precise and restrictive definition of capital
crimes if prosecutors always remain free not to seek the death penalty for a
particular defendant, and juries not to impose it, for any reason whatsoever”)
(emphasis in original).
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noting that the latter “were last to abandon slavery and
segregation, and . . . were most resistant to the federal
enforcement of civil rights norms.”114
Calling the majority’s commentary on race “extraordinary
and inflammatory,” the Santiago dissenters shot back:
[T]he majority suggests that Southerners are racists, and so
are those who support the death penalty. Painting
Southerners and supporters of the death penalty with the
broad brush of racism could appear to some to be racist itself
and reinforces stereotypes that have no foundation in fact or
law.115

In a concurring opinion, Justices Fleming Norcott and
Andrew McDonald traced the “unmistakable racial dimension” of
Connecticut’s death penalty, including the fact that “in almost
400 years, no white person has ever been executed in Connecticut
for the murder of a black person.”116 Like the majority, the
concurring justices emphasized the impermissible risk that “the
death penalty in Connecticut, as elsewhere, has been and
continues to be imposed disproportionately on racial and ethnic
minorities, and particularly on those whose victims are members
of the white majority.”117 Responding to the dissenters’
McCleskey-based argument that there was no evidence of
individual racial animus, the concurring justices discussed the
114. Id. at 52; see also NAACP Amic. Br., supra note 20, at *8 (“[T]he large
proportion of nonwhites who were executed is merely the present phenomenon
of racial discrimination being exercised against the nonwhite. Slavery was
exclusively a Southern phenomenon, lynching was primarily a Southern
phenomenon, and the general data with respect to all crimes, and particularly
the crime of rape, indicates that the South has been the prime contributor to the
disproportionate application of the death penalty to blacks.”).
115. State v. Santiago, 122 A.3d 1, 394–95 (Conn. 2015) (Espinosa, J.,
dissenting); see also id. at 137 n.1 (Rogers, C.J., dissenting) (“Because the
majority points to no evidence that the citizens of this state support slavery or
resist civil rights, I can only conclude that the majority has cited these sources
as part of its general strategy of creating an aura of disrespectability around the
death penalty that is in no manner derived from the contemporary moral values
of this state's legislature or its citizens.”).
116. Id. at 87 (Norcott & McDonald, JJ., concurring).
117. Id. at 96 (Norcott & McDonald, JJ., concurring); see also id. at 95 (“A
thorough and fair-minded review of the available historical and sociological data
thus strongly suggests that systemic racial bias continues to infect the capital
punishment system in Connecticut in the post-Furman era.”) (Norcott &
McDonald, JJ., concurring).
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death penalty’s deeper roots in subordination by the cultural
majority that, regrettably but inevitably, carries through to the
present day:
We strongly emphasize that the fact that a charging or
sentencing decision may be based in part on impermissible
racial factors does not imply that the prosecutor, judge, or
juror making that decision is “racist,” as that term is typically
used. Statistical studies from other jurisdictions have
demonstrated that the most likely explanation for such
disparities is the tendency of members of the majority race to
be more empathetic to majority victims, who resemble
themselves, and less sympathetic to minority perpetrators,
with whom they are less able to identify. This conclusion is
bolstered by recent scientific studies that now document what
has long been recognized: most, if not all, of us exhibit
unconscious or implicit bias.
It likely is the case that many, if not most, of the documented
disparities in capital charging and sentencing arise not from
purposeful, hateful racism or racial animus, but rather from
these sorts of subtle, imperceptible biases on the part of
generally well-meaning decision makers. Historically, though,
it is difficult to refute . . . that, at varying times throughout
our history, the lives of Native Americans, African Americans,
Asians, Irish, Italians, Jews, Roman Catholics, and Hispanics
simply have not been considered to be as innately valuable as
those of the cultural majority.118

Together, these decisions suggest two doctrinal pathways for
the courts’ consideration of the death penalty’s roots in slavery,
which neatly align with the Supreme Court’s two-part
proportionality test under the Eighth Amendment.119
First, in determining whether there exists objective evidence
of a “national consensus” in support of the death penalty, courts
should consider not only the dwindling number of southern states
that retain and impose the death penalty, but also those states’
historical commitment to slavery.120 A penalty rooted in slavery,
118. Id. at 95–96 (Norcott & McDonald, JJ., concurring); see also McCleskey
v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 332 (1987) (“[A]mericans share a historical experience
that has resulted in individuals within the culture ubiquitously attaching a
significance to race that is irrational and often outside their awareness.”).
119. See Kevin Barry, The Death Penalty & the Dignity Clauses, 102 IOWA L.
REV. 383, 418 (2017) (discussing the Court’s two-prong proportionality inquiry).
120. See, e.g., State v. Santiago, 122 A.3d 1, 52 (Conn. 2015) (“The
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which retains robust support among only a small number of
states with a deeply troubling legacy of slavery, is a penalty that
has lost the support of the Nation.121
Second, in determining whether the death penalty furthers
the deterrent and retributive goals of punishment, courts should
acknowledge a state’s legacy of slavery and the death penalty’s
historical roots in slavery, and should consider whether this
linkage creates a substantial risk that race continues to play a
role in the selection of people for death.122 A penalty that risks
deterring primarily black offenders and those who murder
whites, and that risks targeting black people for “just desserts”
and expressing outrage for white but not black victims, does not
further the legitimate purposes of deterrence and retribution. It
furthers racial subordination—an impermissible purpose if ever
there was one.123
Clearly, courts troubled by the death penalty’s connection to
slavery can address this connection in their jurisprudence. But
there are many reasons why courts may not want to do so,
including: concern with alienating southern states by depicting
them as “racist”; the McCleskey majority’s concern with opening
the floodgates to arguments over the role of racism and the legacy
of slavery in non-capital cases;124 and an abiding faith that race
geographic concentration of . . . executions [carried out nationwide since 1976] is
remarkable. The thirteen states that comprised the Confederacy have carried
out more than 75 percent of the nation’s executions over the past four decades.”).
121. Id.
122. See id. at 96 (Norcott & McDonald, JJ., concurring) (“[T]he death
penalty in Connecticut, as elsewhere, has been and continues to be imposed
disproportionately on racial and ethnic minorities, and particularly on those
whose victims are members of the white majority.”); id. at 66 (“[T]he selection of
which offenders live and which offenders die appears to be inescapably tainted
by caprice and bias.”).
123. See Barry, supra note 119, at 424 n.278 (discussing illegitimacy of
racially discriminatory death penalty); cf. STEIKER, supra note 6, at 90–91, 110
(discussing NAACP Legal Defense Fund’s argument in Furman that “the death
penalty remained on the books in large part because of its racially
discriminatory administration”) (emphasis added); NAACP Amic. Br., supra
note 20, at *21 (“Racism, from which many receive concrete economic benefits
and psychic sustenance, subsides with great resistance—especially given the
current attempts by irresponsible politicians to revive fears in the white
populace of the ‘black rebel’ with the code words of ‘Law and Order.’”).
124. See McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 314–15 (1987) (“McCleskey's
claim, taken to its logical conclusion, throws into serious question the principles

206

74 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 184 (2017)

can be removed from the equation of death in the future without
wading into an ugly past. None of these reasons is persuasive.
The alienation of southern states is a legitimate concern but
should not guide the courts in deciding to address slavery. Not all
southerners lost the Civil War; for many of the descendants of
enslaved people and whites whose homes dotted the Underground
Railroad, their South won. Similarly, not all southerners support
the death penalty. A decision acknowledging the death penalty’s
ties to slavery does not disparage a monolithic South; rather, it
pays tribute to southern voices that have not been heard.125
Acknowledging these ties, moreover, does not require calling
anyone a “racist.” As Connecticut Supreme Court Justices
Norcott and McDonald stated, “[t]he types of subtle biases that
influence members of the majority to make decisions favoring
their own race may well be inevitable, albeit regrettable. When
unconsciously made, they do not inherently impugn the diligent
and good faith work of our prosecutors, police, judges, and
jurors.”126
Fear of opening the floodgates to non-capital challenges
based on the legacy of slavery is also overblown. As the
Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court stated, “[o]ur society’s
failure to bring evenhandedness to the entire spectrum of
criminal punishment calls for great and persistent effort toward
improvement. However, we are not required to abandon all such
punishments on constitutional grounds.”127 Stated another way,
“[t]he death penalty is fundamentally different from other
punishments for which we may, reluctantly, have to tolerate

that underlie our entire criminal justice system.”); Steiker, supra note 6, at 98–
109 (discussing various reasons for Supreme Court’s “deafening silence on the
subject of race in its foundational capital punishment cases”).
125. Cf. Ben Jones, The Republican Party, Conservatives, and the Future of
Capital Punishment, J.CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY (forthcoming) (discussing
increasing number of conservatives who have turned against the death penalty
in recent years based on the “[t]he failure of death penalty policy to live up to
key conservative principles—limited government, fiscal responsibility, and
promoting a culture of life”) (draft on file with author).
126. State v. Santiago, 122 A.3d 1, 98 (Conn. 2015) (Norcott & McDonald,
JJ., concurring).
127. Dist. Att’y for Suffolk Cty. v. Watson, 411 N.E.2d 1274, 1286 (Mass.
1980).
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some
degree
of
unintentional
systemic
disparity
or
128
imperfection.”
Lastly, faith in a color-blind death penalty is deeply
misguided. For over forty years, courts have tried and failed to
eliminate race from the death penalty calculus.129 The taint of
bias and caprice, rooted in slavery, simply cannot be removed.
V. The Future of Abolition
It has been over 40 years since Gregg revivified a dying death
penalty.130 For over a decade, Justice Kennedy has applied his
characteristic logic of the heart to the Court’s death penalty
jurisprudence, setting the table for a per se challenge that would
put the death penalty to rest forever.131 At the time of this
writing, it now appears that he is prepared to step away from
that table.132 The settings will be cleared, and the death penalty
will likely remain with us for some time—a crude tool to be used
by politicians to rally their base, to reinvigorate their campaigns,
to make America “great.”133 Power, not principle, will continue to
define the death penalty.
128. State v. Santiago, 122 A.3d 1, 99 (Conn. 2015) (Norcott & McDonald,
JJ., concurring).
129. See Bedau, supra note 52, at 459 (“The good-faith hopes of the Gregg
majority in 1976 . . . have simply not been borne out in practice in the two
decades since then.”); see also Glossip v. Gross, 135 S. Ct. 2726, 2761–62 (2015)
(Breyer, J., dissenting) (discussing racial disparities); State v. Santiago, 122
A.3d 1, 66–68 (same).
130. See Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 169 (1976) (holding that death
penalty is not per se unconstitutional).
131. See Barry, supra note 119, at 417–18 (discussing Justice Kennedy’s role
in “limit[ing] the expansion of the death penalty on dignity grounds” in a series
of judicial decisions over the past decade).
132. See generally Cody Derespina, Chuck Grassley Expects Supreme Court
Resignation
This
Summer,
FOX
NEWS
(Apr.
20,
2017),
http://www.foxnews.com/politics/2017/04/20/chuck-grassley-expects-supremecourt-resignation-this-summer.html (last visited May 29, 2017) (on file with the
Washington and Lee Law Review).
133. See Matt Ford, Donald Trump’s Racially Charged Advocacy of the
Death
Penalty,
THE
ATLANTIC
(Dec.
18,
2015),
https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/
archive/2015/12/donald-trump-deathpenalty/420069/ (last visited May 29, 2017) (discussing then presidential
candidate Donald Trump’s address to police and correctional officers, in which
he called for the death penalty for “anybody killing a police officer”) (on file with
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We remind Justice Kennedy that he can stop this carnival of
cruelty, this macabre charade. History has given him an ability
that few can claim: He can prevent death.134 Should he retire
without declaring the death penalty unconstitutional, we shall
forever number the losses spurred by his inaction. What a waste
of lives and legacy. Rather than the Justice who brought longawaited coherence to the Eighth Amendment’s dignity doctrine,135
Justice Kennedy will become just another retired Justice who
wished he had.136
Eventually, though, the Supreme Court will abolish the
death penalty, bringing the U.S. in line with 141 other
abolitionist countries throughout the world.137 When the Court
abolishes, it will almost certainly base its decision on the death
penalty’s inherently flawed administration—the unreliability,
arbitrary imposition, and protracted delay that deprives the
death penalty of any legitimate purpose.138 The Court might also
the Washington and Lee Law Review).
134. To declare the death penalty unconstitutional, Justice Kennedy would
need the support of Justices Ginsburg, Breyer, Kagan, and Sotomayor—all four
of whom appear willing to declare the death penalty unconstitutional. See
Barry, supra note 119, at 417 (noting that Chief Justice Roberts and Justices
Thomas and Alito support the constitutionality of the death penalty). Justice
Gorsuch seems unlikely to join his four liberal colleagues in abolishing the death
penalty, as suggested by his rejection of stay-of-execution requests as a judge for
the Tenth Circuit and his vote in April 2017 as a Justice of the Supreme Court
to deny a stay request from death row inmates facing execution in Arkansas.
Robert Barnes, Gorsuch Casts Death-Penalty Vote in One of His First Supreme
Court
Cases,
WASH.
POST
(Apr.
21,
2017),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/
courts_law/gorsuch-casts-deathpenalty-vote-in-one-of-his-first-supreme-court-cases/2017/04/21/2d9bc5dc-26a811e7-a1b3-faff0034e2de_story.html?utm_term= .9d0a5aec3919 (last visited June
1, 2017) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
135. See id. at 416–18 (stating that Justice Kennedy has “played a leading
role in pushing dignity closer to the center of American constitutional law and
discourse for a quarter-century”).
136. See, e.g., JOHN C. JEFFRIES, JR., JUSTICE LEWIS F. POWELL, JR. 451–52
(1994) (“I have come to think that capital punishment should be abolished.”).
137. See Death Penalty Info. Ctr., Abolionist and Retentionist Countries,
https://deathpenaltyinfo.org/abolitionist-and-retentionist-countries
(listing
abolitionist and retentionist countries).
138. See Glossip v. Gross, 135 S. Ct. 2726, 2756 (2015) (“Today’s
administration of the death penalty involves three fundamental constitutional
defects: (1) serious unreliability, (2) arbitrariness in application, and
(3) unconscionably long delays that undermine the death penalty's penological
purpose.”).
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find that the death penalty is at odds with human dignity; it is
the ultimate humiliation.139 Such reasoning will be much
welcomed among abolitionists, but an opportunity will have been
missed. As a chronicler of history, the Court should take the
opportunity to shine the light on the role that slavery has played
in perpetuating the legitimacy of the death penalty since colonial
times.140 This will ensure an accurate picture of one of our
country’s most racist institutions. More importantly, it will
ensure that the death penalty, like slavery, never returns.
In the meantime, the abolition movement will continue, with
government, businesses, and private citizens all playing a role.141
Judges, legislators, and governors will continue to halt the death
penalty through judicial abolition, statutory repeal, moratoria,
and clemency. Prosecutors will refuse to seek the death penalty
and defenders will slow its progress through legal challenges to
the death penalty per se and as applied. Police chiefs and prison
wardens will highlight the death penalty’s exorbitant costs and
secondary trauma, while international leaders mobilize the
shame of the world community. Media, researchers, and
academics will focus national and international attention on the
intractable issues of innocence, botched executions, arbitrariness
139. See Barry, supra note 119, at 427–28 (“Hopefully, the Court will
conclude that, even if the death penalty were administered consistently, swiftly,
and reliably, the death penalty would still lack a legitimate penological purpose
because no purpose can justify the State's deprivation of the dignity of life.”)
(emphasis in original); see also Bharat Malkani, Dignity and the Death Penalty
in the United States Supreme Court, 44 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 145, 146–47
(2017) (arguing that “[d]ignity should . . . provide a framework for finding the
death penalty to be contrary to the Eighth Amendment prohibition on ‘cruel and
unusual punishments’”).
140. See STEIKER, supra note 6, at 111 (“[T]he Court’s failure to address
forthrightly the death penalty’s racialized history and current practice has
disserved the Court in its role as a chronicler of history and social and political
practices.”).
141. See generally New Voices, DEATH PENALTY INFO. CENT.,
https://deathpenaltyinfo.org/new-voices (last visited May 29, 2017) (featuring
concerns about the death penalty raised by a diverse array of professionals from
across the political spectrum) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law
Review); see generally DEATH PENALTY INFO. CENT., https://deathpenaltyinfo.org/
(last visited May 30, 2017) (compiling information on, among other things,
arbitrariness, clemency, costs, innocence, disability, racism, inadequate
representation, and the opinion of the international community and victims as it
relates to the death penalty) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
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and racial discrimination, undue delay, disability, poverty, and
inadequate representation. Medical professionals and drug
manufacturers will decry lethal injection’s perversion of medical
ethics. Civil rights organizations, faith groups, and family
members of murder victims will hold vigils, disrupt the flow of
lethal injection drugs, and organize grassroots campaigns to
reform and eventually end the death penalty.
Like the movement to abolish slavery, death penalty
abolition will eventually achieve its end and, in time, will be
widely regarded as right. Indeed, Harriett Tubman, who once had
a price on her head for disrupting the flow of free black labor in
the antebellum south, will soon grace the front of the $20 bill
(although Donald Trump has suggested that slaveholder Andrew
Jackson ought to remain there); the D.C. home of former slave
turned abolitionist statesman, author, and activist Frederick
Douglass is a national historic site; and John Brown, who was
hanged for attempting to overthrow the slave system through
armed conflict, assumed the status of icon “in the eyes of African
Americans, abolitionists, and revolutionaries all over the
world.”142
In anticipation of the death penalty’s inevitable abolition, we
close with the following words of gratitude.
To the growing number of young people in the U.S. who see
the death penalty as an anachronism that divides rather than
unites our increasingly diverse society, we look forward to the
contribution you will make. Indeed, we have already seen it. The
#BlackLivesMatter movement—founded in 2012 in response to
widely publicized incidents of black people being shot by police
officers—has included death penalty abolition among its core
aims, calling out the death penalty for “devalu[ing] Black lives”
and “target[ing] Blacks and other people of color and poor people
throughout . . . history.”143 Although more men of color are
142. Maya Rhodan, The Harriet Tubman $20 Bill Could Make an Early
Debut, TIME (Dec 07, 2016), http://time.com/4593420/harriet-tubman-20-billdonald-trump-design/ (last visited May 29, 2017) (on file with the Washington
and Lee Law Review); see generally SINHA, supra note 22, at 566; Frederick
Douglass, National Historic Site, District of Columbia, NAT’L PARK SERV.,
https://www.nps.gov/frdo/index.htm (last visited May 29, 2017) (on file with the
Washington and Lee Law Review).
143. End the War on Black People, THE MOVEMENT FOR BLACK LIVES
https://policy.m4bl.org/end-war-on-black-people/ (last visited May 29, 2017) (on
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incarcerated and shot by police than are executed each year, the
death penalty is of critical importance for one simple reason: If
the State can execute people of color, it can do anything to people
of color. The death penalty is, quite literally, low-hanging fruit—
and strange fruit, indeed. Be indignant in your advocacy; you
deserve better from your country.
To those like Phyllis Goldfarb who have stood against the
death penalty for so long, we thank you for shining the light that
we follow. We are students of your advocacy—one of us, quite
literally. As you say, the reality that race permeates the
American death penalty “represents not only a profound concern
about inequality and unfairness in the selection of defendants for
death,” but also “an indictment of American systems of capital
punishment.”144 We look forward to the day when the Supreme
Court agrees. In solidarity, and one day in victory, we salute you.
VI. Conclusion
When the history of the death penalty is written, the death
penalty’s connection to slavery will not be a distant parallel but a
straight line. Phyllis Goldfarb’s article, Matters of Strata: Race,
Gender, and Class Structures in Capital Cases traces that line.145
The institution of slavery helps to explains why, over the past
four decades, the thirteen states that comprised the former
Confederacy have been responsible for nearly all of this nation’s
executions.146 Although the U.S. Supreme Court has failed to
address this connection, several state court judges have risen to
the occasion, calling out the impermissible taint of bias that
colors the death penalty. More courts, including the Supreme
Court, should follow their lead. In the meantime, we, like our
abolitionist forebears, will fight. Emancipation was once
file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
144. Goldfarb, supra note 5, at 1397.
145. See id. at 1404–05 (stating that “the ghosts of the colonial and
antebellum slave system continue to inhabit our cultural contests,” particularly
the legal and ideological battles over the death penalty).
146. See State v. Santiago, 122 A.3d 1, 52 (Conn. 2015) (discussing
geographic concentration of executions in the states that comprised the
Confederacy).
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considered “a wild delusive idea,” but it became a reality.147 So,
too, will abolition of the death penalty.

147. See generally Frederick Douglass, Speech on the Dred Scott Decision,
TEACHING AM. HIST., http://teachingamericanhistory.org/library/document/
speech-on-the-dred-scott-decision-2/ (last visited May 29, 2017) (on file with the
Washington and Lee Law Review).

